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For the past quarter of a century, federal policy support for
solar, wind, and other low-carbon, renewable energy technologies
has come primarily in the form of tax incentives.' These tax breaks
consist of two distinct instruments-accelerated depreciation
rateS2 and tax credits.3 Living up to the Brandeisian ideal of states
as laboratories of democracy, 4 state policymakers have shown
significantly more creativity in their policy responses creating a
veritable potpourri of clean energy policies.
Forty-five states and the District of Columbia have
implemented net metering policies that enable utility customers
with solar and other distributed generation assets to run their
electricity meter backwards and be compensated for any power
produced in excess of the customer's power consumption from the
grid. 5 Twenty-nine states, the District of Columbia, and three
United States territories have adopted renewable portfolio
standards that create markets for low-carbon, renewable energy by
requiring electric utilities to source a portion of their sales from
* Associate Professor, Texas A&M University School of Law; Faculty Fellow,
Stanford Law School.
1. See Mark Bolinger et al., Preliminary Evaluation of the Section 1603 Treasury
Grant Program for Renewable Power Projects in the United States, 38 ENERGY POL'Y 6804
(2010).
2. The accelerated depreciation rates that renewable energy assets enjoy today were
first established by the Tax Reform Act of 1986. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
514, 100 Stat. 2085. Today, the federal tax code's Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery
System (MACRS) classifies wind, solar, and a range of other renewable power generation
assets as five-year property, allowing owners to deduct the prorated share of their
investment costs from their taxable income over the course of five years. See 26 I.R.C. §
168(e)(3)(B).
3. Federal tax credits for renewable energy were first created for wind power by the
Energy Policy Act of 1992. See Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat.
2776 (1992). Today, the federal tax code distinguishes between production tax credits, 26
I.R.C. § 45, and investment tax credits, 26 I.R.C. § 48, for renewable energy technologies.
See also Felix Mormann, Fading into the Sunset: Solar and Wind Energy Get Five More
Years of Tax Credits with a Phase-Down, TRENDS (ABA Section of Env't, Energy & Res.,
Chicago, Ill.), May/June 2016, at 9-14 (discussing the latest extension and phase-out of
federal tax credit support for renewables).
4. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
5. See Richard L. Revesz & Burcin Unel, Managing the Future of the Electricity Grid:
Distributed Generation and Net Metering, 41 HARv. ENvTL. L. REV. 43, 47 (2017).
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solar, wind, and other low-carbon renewables.6 A few pioneering
states, meanwhile, have begun to experiment with feed-in tariff
policies that pay eligible generators above-market rates designed
to cover the higher generation costs of emerging climate -friendly,
energy technologies.7
The panoply of federal and state renewable energy policies
deserves great credit for driving significant deployment of solar,
wind, and other renewable energy technologies across the United
States. As these technologies mature and their market share
continues to grow, however, it is time to rethink the policy
landscape that supports them.
Conceptually, renewable energy policies can be construed as
tools to facilitate more sustainable economic development. With
their potential to reduce the greenhouse gas emissions, air
pollution, and water consumption required to power the United
States and world economies,8 this aspiration manifests itself most
obviously in an environmental context. Indeed, early policy design
appeared to focus primarily on environmental sustainability,
seeking to deploy as many renewable energy facilities as possible
with little, if any, concern for the costs required.9 Sustainability,
6. Renewable Portfolio Standard Policies, N.C. CLEAN ENERGY TECH. CTR. (2017),
http://ncsolarcen-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Renewable-Portfolio-
Standards.pdf. Eight more states and one U.S. territory have adopted nonbinding goals for
the deployment of renewables. Id. For a discussion of the history and political background of
state renewable portfolio standards, see Barry Rabe, Race to the Top: The Expanding Role of
U.S. State Renewable Portfolio Standards, 7 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y 10 (2007); see
also Felix Mormann, Constitutional Challenges and Regulatory Opportunities for State
Climate Policy Innovation, 41 HARV. ENvTL. L. REV. 189, 198 (2017) (offering an overview of
renewable portfolio standard design and implementation features).
7. Early adopters of feed-in tariffs at the state level include California, Hawaii,
Maine, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. See S.B. 32, 2009-2010 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 2008); Decisions & Orders, Docket No. 2008-0273, Haw. Pub. Util. Comm'n
(Haw. 2008); S.P. 367, 126th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Me. 2013); H.B. 3039, 75th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Or. 2009), H.B. 3690, 75th Leg., Spec. Sess. (Or. 2010); H.B. 6104, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Jan.
Sess. (R.I. 2011); H. 446, 2009-2010 Leg. Sess. (Vt. 2009); S.B. 5101, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Wash. 2005); S.B. 6170, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2009); S.B. 6658, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Wash. 2010). See also Mormann, supra note 6, at 199 (offering an overview of feed-in tariff
design and implementation features). The policy's misleading name (it does not impose any
tariff on electricity imports or other related activities) is thought to be a tribute to an
overly literal translation of its implementation in Germany as per the 1991
Stromeinspeisungsgesetz (Electricity Feed-in Law). See Paul Gipe, Frequently Asked
Questions about Feed-in Tariffs, Advanced Renewable Tariffs, and Renewable Energy
Payments, WIND-WORKS.ORG (Oct. 30, 2016), https://perma.ccIS3HA-DECB.
8. See Felix Mormann, Clean Energy Federalism, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1621, 1638-41
(2015) (describing the various environmental benefits of renewable energy).
9. For an illustrative example, see Germany's 1993 "Full Cost Rates" program, which
offered to cover the full cost of solar photovoltaic installations. See Full Cost Rates
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however, comes in a variety of flavors.'0 Since the late 2000s, clean
energy policies have reflected growing concern for the cost-
efficiency and, hence, economic sustainability of their promotional
regimes in order to mitigate the overall cost to ratepayers and
taxpayers as solar, wind, and other renewables graduate from
niche markets and enter the mainstream.11
Two and a half decades of policymaking focused primarily
on environmental and economic sustainability have yielded
considerable environmental and economic benefits.1 2 Along the
way, other policy considerations, however, such as the social
sustainability of the transition to a cleaner, renewably fueled
energy economy, have gone largely overlooked. As renewable
energy technologies continue to gain ever-greater traction in the
United States and global energy economies, the social impacts of
their enabling policies become more and more salient. Already,
ratepayers, taxpayers, and other stakeholders who fear being
left behind by the clean energy transition question the
"fairness" of today's renewable energy policies.'8 The underlying
discontentment threatens to erode popular support for a key
component of United States and global efforts to successfully




10. See infra Part III.
11. See, e.g., American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5,
123 Stat. 115 (establishing the §1603 "Cash Grant" program to remedy renewable energy
project financing inefficiencies flowing from the 2008/09 financial crisis); see also Lincoln L.
Davies & Kirsten Allen, Feed-in Tariffs in Turmoil, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 937, 956-58 (2014)
(describing repeated adjustments to the German feed-in tariff in order to prevent costs from
getting out of hand).
12. See, e.g., Felix Mormann et al., A Tale of Three Markets: Comparing the Renewable
Energy Experiences of California, Texas, and Germany, 35 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 55, 74 (2016)
(discussing the job creation benefits associated with renewable nergy deployment in
California, Texas, and Germany); Kyle Siler-Evans et al., Regional Variations in the Health,
Environmental, and Climate Benefits of Wind and Solar Generation, 110 PNAS 11768
(2013) (exploring the diverse environmental benefits of renewable energy).
13. See, e.g., Hiroko Tabuchi, Rooftop Solar Dims Under Pressure from Utility
Lobbyists, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/08/climate/rooftop-
solar-panels-tax-credits-utility-companies-lobbying.htnl (describing utility-led pushback
against net metering and other clean energy policies); see also Troy A. Rule, Solar Energy,
Utilities, and Fairness, 6 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 115 (2015) (surveying the
debate over the "fairness" of net metering policies).
14. See Framework Convention on Climate Change, Adoption of the Paris Agreement,
U.N. Doc. FCC/CP/2015/L.9 (Dec. 12, 2015), https://perma.cc/DS9K-M28X. The Paris
agreement entered into force on November 4, 2016, less than a year after its adoption,
following ratification by 55 countries accounting for at least 55% of global greenhouse gas
emissions, including the United States. See Paris Accord - Status of Ratification, UNITED
NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, https://perma.cc/5VEF-A8W9 (last
visited Mar. 2, 2018); see also Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary
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debate lies the question of whether public policy support for
low-carbon renewables prioritizes environmental and economic
sustainability at the expense of social sustainability.
Legal scholars have only just begun to explore the social
challenges posed by the transition to a low-carbon, renewables-
based, energy economy.15 What is missing from this discourse is a
framework to guide the inquiry into the social sustainability of
public policy support for renewable energy. This essay offers a first
step toward closing that gap through a set of proxy criteria to
assess the social sustainability of today's renewable energy
policy landscape and to inform the development of the next
generation of renewables policies-a generation that, ideally, will
simultaneously promote environmental, economic, and social
sustainability.
Importantly, this essay does not seek to call into question the
ongoing transition toward a low-carbon, largely-renewables-based,
energy economy. To be sure, reduced reliance on coal and other
carbon-intensive fossil fuels engenders its own social challenges,
such as in the form of jobs lost in mining, refining, and
related sectors.16 But environmental and, ultimately, economic
imperatives leave little room for alternative courses of action if
global warming is, indeed, to be limited to the crucial 2-degree
Celsius mark.'7 The social cost of continued carbon emissions from
a primarily fossil-fueled power sector is simply too large to
consider business as usual with continued reliance on fossil fuels a
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64662 (Oct. 23, 2015) [hereinafter
Clean Power Plan] (calling, among others, on states to replace affected fossil fuel-fired
power plants with new, zero-emitting solar, wind, and other renewable energy generating
capacity). As this essay is going to print, a proposed rule for the repeal of the "Clean Power
Plan" is pending. See Electric Utility Generating Units: Repealing the Clean Power Plan,
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (EPA), https://www.epa.gov/stationary-sources-
air-pollution/electric-utility-generating-units-repealing-clean-power-plan (last updated
Feb. 27, 2018).
15. See, e.g., Uma Outka, Fairness in the Low-Carbon Shift: Learning From
Environmental Justice, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 789 (2017); Shelley Welton, Clean Electrification,
88 U. COLO. L. REV. 571 (2017); Rule, supra note 13.
16. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, U.S. ENERGY AND EMPLOYMENT REPORT 20-23,
37-43 (2017) (describing the recent decline in employment in oil and gas extraction and coal
mining compared to job growth in solar and other renewable energy).
17. See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Summary for
Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 3 (Thomas F.
Stocker et al. eds., 2013) (discussing the importance of limiting global warming to no more
than 2 degrees Celsius in order to avoid disastrous and irreparable damage to the global
ecosystem); see also INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Summary for
Policymakers, in SPECIAL REPORT ON RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES AND CLIMATE CHANGE
MITIGATION 3, 3-26 (Ottmar Edenhofer et al. eds., 2011) (discussing the opportunities and
challenges associated with the ramp-up of low-carbon, renewable energy technologies).
346 [Vol. 33:2
CLEAN ENERGYPOLICY
sustainable option in any sense of the word.' 8 The goal of this
essay, therefore, is not to question the "if' but rather to explore
and, ideally, improve the "how" of the shift toward a less carbon-
intensive, renewably-fueled, energy economy. To this end, the
following three sections seek to develop a framework for
testing and, ultimately, enhancing the social and, hence, overall
sustainability of policies for the promotion of solar, wind, and other
renewable energy technologies.
II. COMPETING DEFINITIONS OF SUSTAINABILITY
The term "sustainability," or some derivative thereof, features
prominently among the objectives of clean-energy policies. 19
Yet, many policymakers-and scholars-appear to focus over-
whelmingly on the environmental and, possibly, economic
dimensions of sustainability with little, if any, regard for the
concept's inherent, social elements.20 The 1992 United Nations Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, for example, calls
for greater environmental protection as well as consideration
of social and economic costs in order to achieve sustainable
18. See, e.g., Mathew E. Hauer et al., Millions Projected to Be at Risk From Sea-Level
Rise in the Contintental United States, 6 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 691, 691 (2016)
(highlighting the threat of mass migration due to anthropogenic climate change); Jonathan
Levy & Jack Spengler, Health Benefits of Emissions Reductions from Older Power Plants,
RISK IN PERSP. (Harvard Ctr. For Risk Analysis, Boston, Mass.), Apr. 2001, at 1, 2-4
(reporting on the high concentration of air pollutants and adverse health impacts in the
vicinity of coal and other fossil-fueled power plants); see also Siler-Evans et al., supra note
12.
19. The Energy Policy Act of 1992, for example, references the term "sustainable" no
fewer than eleven times. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776.
The California Senate Bill 1078, which established the state's original renewable portfolio
standard, references "sustainable economic development" as one of the program's key
aspirations. S.B. 1078, 2001-2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002). Enabling legislation for
Maine's feed-in tariff opens by naming "sustainable development" as a key objective. S.P.
367, 126th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Me. 2013).
20. See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig & Melinda Harm Benson, Replacing Sustainability,
46 AKRON L. REV. 841 (2013); John C. Dernbach, Sustainable Development: Now More Than
Ever, 32 ENvTL. L. REP. 10003 (2002); John C. Dernbach et al., Sustainability as a Means of
Improving Environmental Justice, 19 J. ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY L. 1 (2013); Alexandra B.
Mass & Sara E. Bergan, Carbon Sequestration and Sustainability, 44 TULSA L. REV. 237
(2008); see also Thomas M. Parris & Robert W. Kates, Characterizing and Measuring
Sustainable Development, 28 ANN. REV. ENV'T & RES. 559, 560-61 (2003) (highlighting the
role of equity and equal opportunity in the context of sustainable development).
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development. 21 Others expressly distinguish among environ-
mental, economic, social, and political notions of sustainability.22
Whatever one's preferred taxonomy, there is no universally
agreed upon definition of social sustainability due to the academic
community's inability to reach consensus on the constituent
elements of socially sustainable development.23 Similarly, well over
five hundred projects have attempted to develop quantitative
indicators of sustainable development. 24 Yet, no indicators are
universally accepted, and the proposed measurement systems
serve, at best, as navigational aids for the shift toward more
sustainable development. 25 Rather than add to the controversy
and confusion over a working definition of socially sustainable
development, this essay employs a set of proxy criteria that reflect
recurring, dominant hemes in the pertinent literature. Combined
in a cohesive framework, these criteria offer a way to assess the
social sustainability of today's generation of renewable energy
policies.
III. CLEAN ENERGY POLICY IN CONTEXT
Policies to promote renewable energy technologies can take a
variety of forms. Economists have long suggested that pricing
greenhouse gas emissions, in the form of a carbon tax 2 6 or cap-and-
trade regime,27 is, in theory, the single most efficient policy to
mitigate climate change and promote abatement echnologies such
as solar, wind, and other low-carbon renewables.2 8 A price on
21. See U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), annex I
(Aug. 12, 1992) (Principles 4 and 11).
22. See, e.g., G. Assefa & B. Frostell, Social Sustainability and Social Acceptance in
Technology Assessment: A Case Study of Energy Technologies, 29 TECH. SOCIETY 63, 64
(2007).
23. Id. at 65.
24. Parris & Kates, supra note 20, at 559 ("Despite the persistent definitional
ambiguities associated with sustainable development, much work (over 500 efforts) has
been devoted to developing quantitative indicators of sustainable development.").
25. See Assefa & Frostell, supra note 22, at 65.
26. See, e.g., Gilbert E. Metcalf & David Weisbach, The Design of a Carbon Tax, 33
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 499 (2009).
27. See, e.g., Ann E. Carlson, Designing Effective Climate Policy: Cap-and-Trade and
Complimentary Policies, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 207 (2012).
28. See, e.g., NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN
REVIEW 35, 348 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2007); Dominique Finon, Pros and Cons of
Alternative Policies Aimed at Promoting Renewables, in 12 EIB PAPERS: AN EFFICIENT,
SUSTAINABLE AND SECURE SUPPLY OF ENERGY FOR EUROPE MEETING THE CHALLENGE 110,
112 (Armin Riess ed., 2007); Adam B. Jaffe et al., A Tale of Two Market Failures:
Technology and Environmental Policy, 54 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 164, 165, 169 (2005); Atanas
Kolev & Armin Riess, Environmental and Technology Externalities: Policy and Investment
348 [Vol. 33:2
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greenhouse gas emissions would require producers to internalize
the cost of their emissions, thereby penalizing pollution and
encouraging abatement. Over time, this direct, static effect would
be complemented by an indirect, dynamic effect of encouraging the
refinement of existing and development of new abatement
technologies.29 From an efficiency perspective, a tax on greenhouse
gas emissions or a cap-and-trade scheme would incur lower
opportunity costs than direct public policy support for these
technologies.30
Notwithstanding its theoretical appeal, the adoption of a
nationwide or, better yet, global policy regime that accurately
prices the societal cost of greenhouse gas emissions is politically
unlikely in the near- to medium-term.3 1 Accordingly, this essay
focuses its social sustainability inquiry on policies directly aimed
at the large-scale deployment of solar, wind, and other renewables,
such as renewable portfolio standards, feed-in tariffs, net energy
metering, and tax incentives for renewable energy generators.
IV. PROXY CRITERIA TO ASSESS THE SOCIAL SUSTAINABILITY
OF CLEAN ENERGY POLICIES
Sustainability, in general, and social sustainability, in
particular, have proven themselves as elusive concepts. The
multitude of normative judgments underlying both concepts has
yielded a multitude of competing definitions. Rather than add yet
another working definition, this essay draws on the existing
literature to distill from it three somewhat interrelated criteria
that most sustainability scholars seem to accept as proxy
indicators for socially sustainable development. Application of
these criteria to different renewable energy policies can shed light
on their respective impact on the social sustainability of the
transition to a low-carbon, renewably powered energy economy.
Just as the environmental and economic sustainability of a
renewable energy policy is best judged based on the specifics of
Implications, in 12 EIB PAPERS: AN EFFICIENT, SUSTAINABLE AND SECURE SUPPLY OF
ENERGY FOR EUROPE MEETING THE CHALLENGE 134, 140 (Armin Riess ed., 2007).
29. See Kolev & Riess, supra note 28, at 137 (discussing the impact of environmental
policy on technological change).
30. Felix Mormann, Requirements for a Renewables Revolution, 38 ECOLOGY L. Q. 903,
929 (2011).
31. For issues related to the political economy of emission pricing, see id. at 930-32.
For evidence of the failed campaigns for a federal cap-and-trade regime, see S. 1733, 111th
Cong. (2009); H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009). See also Gary Lucas, Jr., Voter Psychology and
the Carbon Tax, 90 TEMPLE L. REV. 1 (2017) (describing behavioral challenges and
opportunities for carbon taxation).
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its design and implementation, so is its social sustainability
most accurately assessed against the background of a specific
implementation, as opposed to an abstract treatise. To illustrate,
the following framework of proposed criteria will be complemented
by their sample application to one of today's clean energy policies.
A. Access and Availability
The first criterion hones in on access and availability. With
equal opportunity a staple of the social sustainability literature,32
socially sustainable renewable energy policies should offer the
broadest possible access to related benefits. In this context,
widespread access and availability should not be limited to
the environmental benefits associated with clean, low-carbon
renewables. Climate science suggests that the heat-trapping effect
of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere manifests itself worldwide,
regardless of whether these gases are emitted in New York or
New Delhi.33 Conversely, benefits from climate change mitigation
through greenhouse gas emission reductions from solar and wind
energy that displaces carbon-intensive, fossil-fueled energy accrue
to the world at large. 34 Accordingly, any effective, renewable
energy policy naturally delivers environmental benefits that are
widely accessible and available.
The question of access and availability is much less straight-
forward, however, when it comes to economic benefits. Renewable
energy policies are expected to leverage trillions of dollarS35 for
clean energy investment. The allocation and distribution of this
massive amount of capital will inevitably impact the income and
wealth distribution among the affected citizenry. What portion of a
state's population can participate in its feed-in tariff program?
How many taxpayers are in a position to benefit from federal tax
32. See, e.g., Parris & Kates, supra note 20, at 561 (noting the importance of equal
opportunity for the taxonomy of sustainable development); Assefa & Frostell, supra note 22,
at 65 (highlighting the role of "fairness in distribution and opportunity" for socially
sustainable systems).
33. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 523-24 (2007)
(acknowledging that the warming effect of greenhouse gas emissions manifests itself
globally regardless of their point of origin, but rejecting the EPA's argument that, therefore,
regulation of domestic greenhouse gas emissions would be ineffective due to projected
increases in greenhouse gas emissions from China, India, and other developing nations).
34. Other environmental benefits associated with substituting renewable energy
generation for fossil-fueled power generation, such as air quality improvements and water
conservation, accrue at a more local scale. See Mormann, supra note 8, at 1638-41
(describing the local environmental benefits associated with renewable energy).
35. See, e.g., INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2016, 21 (Robert
Priddle ed., 2016) ("An increasing slice of the roughly $1.8 trillion of investment each year
in the energy sector has been attracted to clean energy . . . ").
350 [Vol. 33:2
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credits for renewables? The answers to these questions describe
the general public's ability to participate in, and benefit from,
the economic opportunities of renewable energy policy with
obvious implications for distributional equity and, hence, social
sustainability.
Federal tax credits, for example, score poorly in terms of access
and availability, because they create economic opportunities only
for a small group of banks, financial firms, and highly profitable
corporations.36 Most others lack the quintessential requirement to
benefit from federal tax breaks-a tax bill that is high enough to
offset and thereby reap the full and immediate benefits of tax
credits.37 Not all barriers to access are similarly obvious. Feed-in
tariffs, for instance, are frequently praised for the wide array of
economic opportunities they create.38 Yet, participation in Oregon's
feed-in tariff program skews toward highly educated dual-income
households that own single-family homes worth over $300,000,39
suggesting that both financial and educational barriers may
prevent more widespread access to the program's economic
benefits.40
36. Historically, fewer than two dozen highly profitable and sophisticated entities-
mostly large banks, insurance companies, and other financial firms-have been willing and
able to support renewable energy projects through their tax equity investments. See
Reassessing Renewable Energy Subsidies: Issue Brief, BIPARTISAN POL'Y CTR., (Bipartisan
Pol'y Ctr., Washington, D.C.), Mar. 22, 2011, at 9-11.
37. See, e.g., Felix Mormann, Beyond Tax Credits: Smarter Tax Policy for a Cleaner,
More Democratic Energy Future, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 303 (2014) (offering a critique of the
exclusivity of tax credits and the resulting inefficiencies); Renewable Energy Project Finance
in the U.S.: 2010-2013 Overview and Future Outlook, GREENTECH MEDIA (Mar. 15, 2012,
1:00 PM), https://www.greentechmedia.com/events/webinar/renewable-energy-project-
finance-in-the-u.s.-2010-2013-overview-and-future-#gs.nw7w_tO; BIPARTISAN POL'Y CTR.,
supra note 36, at 9; Bolinger et al., supra note 1, at 6804; see also STEVE CORNELI, U.S.
PARTNERSHIP FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY FINANCE, CLEAN ENERGY AND TAX REFORM: How
TAx POLICY CAN HELP RENEWABLE ENERGY CONTRIBUTE TO ECONOMIC GROWTH, ENERGY
SECURITY AND A BALANCED BUDGET 13 (2012); JOHN P. HARPER ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF
ENERGY, WIND PROJECT FINANCING STRUCTURES: A REVIEW & COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
(2007) (noting that only a handful of large developers are able to make use of the federal tax
credits).
38. See Felix Mormann, Enhancing the Investor Appeal of Renewable Energy, 42
ENVTL. L. 681, 714-17 (2012) (describing the wide range of investment opportunities
provided by feed-in tariffs).
39. See OREGON PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION, INVESTIGATION INTO THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF SOLAR PROGRAMS IN OREGON 29, 30 (2014).
40. Some have suggested that the subscription process may also prevent more
widespread participation in Oregon's feed-in tariff program. See Public Utility Commission
of Oregon, Comment and Discussion on Solar Photovoltaic (Feb. 11, 2011) (Statement of
Dave Sullivan on Pilot Solar Incentive Program), http://edoes.puc.state.or.us/efdocs/HAC/
um1505hac131725.pdf.
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B. Allocation of Cost
The second criterion focuses on the allocation of costs.
Policymakers across the globe and in the United States4' seek to
promote solar, wind, and other renewables using either price- or
quantity-based policies. 42 Price-based policies, such as feed-in
tariffs or tax credits, offer eligible generators above-market rates
for their electricity designed to cover costs, and allow for
reasonable returns on investment.43 Quantity-based policies, such
as renewable portfolio standards and tender regimes, create
markets and demand for clean energy, leaving the price
determination to the market's invisible hand.44 Whatever their
methodological approach, these policy mechanisms incur costs
required to bridge the gap between incumbent fossil fuel
technologies and emerging low-carbon, renewable energy
technologies.
How these costs are allocated among constituents directly
affects a renewable energy policy's distributional equity and
social sustainability. Is the cost of tax credits spread across all
taxpayers? Do all ratepayers pitch in to reimburse the electric
utility for its expenses to meet the renewable portfolio standard's
sourcing requirement? And how does the method and breadth of
cost allocation compare to the first criterion-access and
availability of economic benefits and opportunities?
Germany's feed-in tariff offers an illustrative example of the
important role that cost allocation plays in shaping a policy's social
sustainability. Critics of Germany's Energiewende45 decry that
"German families are being hit by rapidly increasing electricity
41. See supra Part II.
42. See INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, DEPLOYING RENEWABLES: PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE
POLICIES 92-93 (Ian Torrens ed., 2008) (laying out the distinction between quantity-based
and price-based renewable energy policies). For recent scholarship suggesting closer
integration of both policies, see Felix Mormann, Re-Allocating Risk: The Case for Closer
Integration of Price- and Quantity-Based Support Policies for Clean Energy, 27 ELECTRICITY
J. 9 (2014).
43. See, e.g., Pierre Bull et al., Designing Feed-in Tariff Policies to Scale Clean
Distributed Generation in the U.S., 24 THE ELECTRICITY J. 52 (2011); Reinhard Haas et al.,
A Historical Review of Promotion Strategies for Electricity from Renewable Energy Sources
in E.U. Countries, 15 RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REV. 1003 (2011).
44. See, e.g., Ryan Wiser et al., The Experience with Renewable Portfolio Standards in
the United States, 20 THE ELECTRICITY J. 8 (2007); Trent Berry & Mark Jaccard, The
Renewable Portfolio Standard: Design Considerations and an Implementation Survey, 29
ENERGY POL'Y 263 (2001).
45. For an introduction to Germany's ambitious energy policy, sometimes translated
as "energy transition," see Germany's New Energy Policy: Heading Towards 2050 with
Secure, Affordable and Environmentally Sound Energy, SPECIAL BROCHURE: SPOTLIGHT ON
ECON. POL'Y (Fed. Ministry of Econ. & Tech., Berlin, Germany), April 2012.
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rates." 4 6 These concerns are likely prompted by the fact that
Germany exempts well over 2,000 electricity-intensive industrial
customers, such as large-scale chemical, steel, and paper
industries, from part, if not all, of the feed-in tariff levy.4 7 When
those who consume the most electricity contribute the least-if
anything-to funding policies to decarbonize the local energy
economy, social sustainability suffers.
C. Program Externalities
The third criterion explores program externalities. Policies to
promote the large-scale deployment of renewable energy inevitably
create winners and losers.48 Solar, wind, and other renewables
tend to be obvious winners under these regimes while coal and
other displaced fossil-fueled power plants tend to find themselves
on the losing side of the policy divide. In addition to such
intentional and transparent value judgments, renewable energy
policies can impose other, less obvious, and often unintended
burdens on third parties. The involuntary nature of such program
externalities suggests that they may not actually advance the
cause of renewable energy, but, instead, unnecessarily harm the
social sustainability of clean energy policies.
Federal tax incentives offer an illustrative example of a clean
energy policy's externalities. Wind power generators only earn
production tax credits for electricity they generate and feed into
the grid for sale to a third party.49 The latter requirement has
wreaked havoc on wholesale electricity markets. In cases of low
demand, network operators were historically able to signal to
power plants that they should decrease their output, or ramp
down, by gradually reducing the offer price near or, in some cases,
to zero. With no fuel costs and a production tax credit tied to power
production and sales, wind generators have a strong incentive to
continue to produce and feed power into the grid unless and until
46. Melissa Eddy & Stanley Reed, Germany's Effort at Clean Energy Proves Complex,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/19/world/europe/germanys-
effort-at-clean-energy-proves-complex.html.
47. See BDEW, ERNEUERBARE ENERGIEN UND DAS EEG: ZAHLEN, FAKTEN, GRAFIKEN
51 (2014) https://www.bdew.de/internet.nsflidlbdew-publikation-erneuerbare-energien-und-
das-eeg-zahlen-fakten-grafiken-2014-de/$file/Energie-Info Erneuerbare%20Energien%
20und%20das%20EEG%202014_korr%2027.02.2014_final.pdf; see also Mormann et al.,
supra note 12 (placing Germany's electricity cost in international and macroeconomic
context).
48. See, e.g., Zachary Liscow & Quentin Karpilow, Innovation Snowballing and
Climate Law, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 387 (2017) (describing the well-established narrative of
public policy support for renewable energy technologies picking winners and losers).
49. See 26 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2012).
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prices go so far below zero that they eat up all of their tax credits.
As a result, where network operators used to send a zero-price
signal, they now have to use a negative-price signal to achieve the
same effect.50 These negative-price signals impose harsh burdens
on generators without ax credits, such as coal power plants who
take longer than others to ramp down and, ultimately pay a
penalty in the amount of negative pricing required to persuade
wind generators and other recipients of production tax credits that
they should reduce their output to maintain the electric grid's
delicate balance.
V. CONCLUSION
Federal and, especially, state policymakers deserve great credit
for helping move solar, wind, and other renewables out of the lab
and into the marketplace. As these technologies graduate from
niche markets into the mainstream, their enabling policy
landscape warrants rethinking. Back when solar cells produced
barely enough electricity to power a pocket calculator, it made
good sense to focus on their enormous potential to advance
environmental sustainability and promote them at all cost. With
policymakers seeking to solidify their commitment to a clean
energy future and to secure reelection, it came as no surprise that
economic sustainability soon took over as the defining element of
renewable energy policies. The time has come to complete the
clean energy policy puzzle by honoring the social dimension of
sustainability. The framework of proxy criteria proposed in this
essay is intended to help policymakers and scholars alike as they
assess the social implications of today's policy landscape and
consider improvements for the next generation of clean energy
policies-a generation that, hopefully, will simultaneously promote
environmental, economic, and social sustainability.
50. See, e.g., FRANK HuNTOwSKI ET AL., NORTHBRIDGE GROUP STUDY, NEGATIVE
ELECTRICITY PRICES AND THE PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT: WHY WIND PRODUCERS CAN PAY US
TO TAKE THEIR POWER - AND WHY THAT IS A BAD THING 12 & fig.8 (2012) ("[Negative prices
are most prevalent when wind output is highest relative to overall demand, such as during
the overnight hours in the spring and fall months when wind output is high but demand is
relatively low and less power is needed.').
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